vaccine will be bene fi c ial. Thi s is parallel to the fact thai whil e any one research project mig ht no t be benefi cial. the histo ry of biomedical research makes it extremely probabl e, indeed mo rall y cenain, th at some proj ect involving the use o f such ce ll -lines w ill be benefi c iaL There may, o f course, be quantitati ve difference between the cases-the probabilities and benefit s may nOI be equal-but the differe nce does no t see m to be a qualitative one, Therefore . if o ne accepts the use o f the cell-lines in vacc ines. one sho uld accept the use in research in at least some conce ivable and perhaps actual c ircumstances.
The main argument I am interested in. in favo r of the use of the celllines, proceed s by first granting that the initial abortio n and extraction of cell s fro m the deceased fetu s was morally gravely illic it. However, the connection between the currently used de ri ved cell s and the abortio n and original deri vati on is suffic ientl y re mo te that the use becomes licit. Not all fruit of a poi soned tree is po isoned: it can be mora lly acceptable to profit from a remo te evil act. The curre ntly used cell s are te mporall y and gene rationall y far removed from the origi nally extracted cells. Moreover. they are ontologicall y removed by the initi al transfanmtion which re ndered them capable o f the unlimited g rowth needed for culturing. Futthem lOre. at least in the case uf some o f the research projects, tho ug h perhaps no t in the case o f some o f the vaccine proj ects. neither the individuals no r the companies involved in the init ial illicit act profit economicall y from the continuation of the research. Those maki ng use of the ce ll-lines may be quite un aware of the ir o rig in. o r may have bee n unaware at the beginning o f the use thereof. and hence cannot be said to be tac itly or overtly approving the illicit source. Finall y. it can be arg ued that ilS a matter o f fact the continued use of these ce ll-lines . unlike perhaps in the case of stem-cell lines. does not increase the market de mand fa r new cell -lines, and therefore the use of such cell-lines does nOi encourage flUt her illic it acts.
The arguments in favor of the use of these ce ll-lines are powerful and I believe largely convincing. But no nethe less . those who have a strong belie f in the illicitness of the initi al aborti on and cell-line derivation. fee l a discomfort with the use of the lines. even if they are convinced by the argument s, Fo r instance. Dr . Edmund Pe llegrino. in conversati on. talked abo ut the need for us to sometimes get our " hands dirty". Yet it appears that if the arg ument s are sound. the hands of the researc her need not get at all dirty: the researcher is do ing something mora ll y q uite unobj ect ionable. it appears. A ny di scomfo rt. thus, appears to be mi staken a nd irrat ional, a confusio n between an arg uabl y ratio nal disapproval of the initial illic it acts o f abortion or derivation and an irrat ional di staste fo r the use o f bi o logical material ultimately produced by these acts.
h is this di scomfort that I w ish to analyze in thi s paper. I will argue lhat there is indeed a ratio nal source for the di scomfo tt . Now, there are two 336 Linacre Quarterly \ radical position s one can hold vis·a-vi s the use of ce ll-lines as described. First . o ne might think thai such use is intrinsically wro ng. and hence cannot be tolerated no matter Ihe benefit s or distance from the origina l illic it activi ty. Thi s is the "radicall y restri ctive" position . Second, one might think that given the di stance from the initial derivation. current use of the ce ll·lines is permi ssible for ally beneficial purpose. no matter how small. providing that such use does not lead to other bad results. Thi s is the "radically permi ssive" posit io n. Obviou sly, anyone who ho lds that the initial abortion and derivali on were morally licit will take the radically permi ssive position. but il appears thai by the above arguments everyone should take thi s position . And indeed there arc Catho lic ethicists convinced of the grave wrongfulness o f the initi:11 act s who take the radi cally permi ssive position. The qualifier that the use does not lead to other bad result s is there in part because these ethic ists may. however. think thai knowing about some uses o f the cell ·l ines may cause a third pallY unjustifiab ly to come to the mistaken belief that. say, abortion is morally perrnissible. I wi ll argue. however. that both of the extreme positions are mi staken . The ri ght position is that one may use the ce ll -li nes for slIfficiell1ly beneficial purposes but not for other purposes . I w ill argue for th is claim without making usc oftbe "scandal"' argumcllt that the use of the ce ll· lines may cause people to come to mistaken beliefs about. say. the morality of abortion or to be encouraged to cOlllmit other illicit acts. Neither am I interestcd in arguments that such use of cel1 · lines may create a demand for more cell -lines in the future. My lack of imeresl in these argume nts is purely analytic: these arguments may indeed be sound fo r all J know, in which case a more restricti ve position is appropriate. What I would like to exam ine. however. is what we can say solely o n the basis of the facl s about cooperati on with past ev il.
Moreover. while there are very important biocthical issues at stake in the concrete issue of cell·lines, what interests me 1Il0st is not the actual case but the general issue of cooperation with past ev il. It is by analyzing cooperation w ith evi l that I shall arrive at my " Illoderate" position.
Moreover. surprisingly. this analysis may throw light on what pril1la!acie
seems a completely different but no less thorny issue: the problem of the justificat io n o f retributive puni shment.
The Radically Restrictive Position
I take it for granted . both for the purposes of the argument and ill persO/U/ propria. that intentional abortion is a mom ll y illi cit act of killing a juridically innocent human person. Moreover, one can argue that extracting ti ssue o r organ s from the body of a dead person is only pemli ssible with the permi ssion of thai person or of a responsible proxy-thi s is because appropriate respect for the bod ies of deceased persons is called for. An aborted fetus does not give implic it or ex plicit permi ssion for such extraction. On the contrary. one might argue thut one can always presume non~coopera li o n between the 1l00Hvilling victim of an illic it killing and the person involved in the killing. If so, then even withou t considering the question of prox ies. we might argue that no one complie!1 in the killing wou ld be permitted \0 ex tracllhc tissue.
And. in any case. no one compli cit with the abortion counts as a " responsible proxy" if abortion is an illicit ki lling of a human person. For instance. our societ), ri ghtly takes a parent to lose his o r her parental rights a fter intentionally attempti ng to inn ic! grave harm on a chi ld. Since abort ion is suc h a grave harm, those parents eom plic it in the abortion cannot (:ount as responsible parties. and hence the ir permi ssion for the use of ti ssue or organs would be irrelevan t. Furthermore. therl.! does not appear to be any olher responsi ble party around to authori ze such extraction. The , two exceptions would be a case where either the mother is coerced into i undergoing the abortio n and conse nts to the use of the ti ssue or organs, and r a case whe re the fa ther disapproves of the abOltio n and consents to the tissue or organ extract io n. Nonetheless, I am not aware of any evidence ) that any of the ce ll-linl.!s generall y under di scussion origi nate in o ne of these two exceptio na l circulllstances. Thus. it seems, the initial ex traction Wi.IS wrong, Moreover, thi s extract iun was almost surdy JUIlt: in duse cooperation with the person performing the abortio n. and that gives further reason to think it wrong. and indeed seri ously so.
Bu t it does not follow from the factlhat something is the product of a grave ly illicit action thilt we are not permined to make good use of it. One can lic itl y li ve in a building o ri ginall y bu ilt by slave labor. If an ethni c group were entirely wiped out through genoc ide, there wou ld be no moral impemtive to keep their land vacant unti l the end of history. A pol iceman on ly makes a li ving bec.tuse of the immoral actions of c riminal s. Now. one might make a specific argu ment that in the case at hand. the usc of the ce ll·lines is illicit. For instance, if o ne believes that the end result of the derivation process is still a pan of the body of the deceased fetu s, then o ne may think that the argument that prohibited the derivatio n continues to prohibit the use of the cell -lines. However, such reasoning wou ld be incorrect. First. as The on ly other argumelllth<lt comes 10 mind he re is that each human be ing has some -" pec ial righ!. perhaps aki n to "copyright" or " paten t right", to hi s ge net ic code, And indeed laws to that effect have been passed in some locales and there are soc ietal attitudes that might make this somewhat pla usible. T hus. many peop le would object to the research use of DNA ex tracted wi thout the person's permission I' TOm items that are no longe r a part of person's body and indeed that no longer are even the person's property, suc h as hai r cl ippi ngs left behind in the hair-dresser's sho p. The one exception they mig ht make would be in the case of DNA thought to possibly origi nate from a gu ilty party, such as DNA ex tracted fro m items le ft at a cri me scene. I must confess that I do not have a convinc ing res ponse to thi s argument apm1 from the autobiographical statement that it has lill ie traction un me. I see no reason why I should have ow nershi p over the info rmation contai ned in my DNA. if thi s is information that ne ither was CI'e~tted by me nor was created by someone else who has ceded title to me. 1' vly parellls did not create my DNA in the way that an arti st cremes a paillli ng; the process involved appare nt ra ndomness. The on ly candi date for " creator of the DNA is God, and I have no ev idence that God has ceded ownership over this info rmation to the ind ividuals in whom it is embodied. or. for that matter. that God prohibi ts the lI SC of til is in format ion .
T ht! Pu isullt!d Tn:!t!

3,1. Formal ami mll/erial coopemti oll with evil
Traditiona lly, cooperat ion with ev il is divided imo the forma l and the mate ri a!.: You forma lly cooperate in someone's illici t action provided the achievin g of the same illic it object of activ ity is a pan of your action pl an. Here, I am assumi ng that agents have action plans that stipul ate both fi na l goal and inte rmediate sub-goa l. each of whi ch I call an "object", and each of the goa ls is something inte nded, e ither as a n end or as a means. An action is said to be "i ntri nsically wrong" provided some object of it-say, someone's being humi liated (as opposed to bumbled, whic h wou ld be a good thing)-is such that it is always wrong to intend it. O ne forma lly L'ooperates with an illic it action if and onl y if one cooperates in such a way that one intc nds to achieve that object which is ill ic it. Any other ki nd of cooperation is materia!' It ana lytica lly follows from the above thai formal cooperation in an intrinsically wrong action is intrinsically wrong, since it involves intending a goal the inte nd ing of which is intrinsicall y wrong, Cooperati on in ev il can be unde rstood in many ways. We can understand it as helpi ng the agent achieve hi s illi cit goal. or we can understand it as being "an accessory a ft er the fact", say, by prai sing the agent or by bel ping the agent avoid the just consequences of the action. Each of these can bt~ formal or materia l: on the formal side we can praise the aget1l in such <' 1 way as 10 ex press our standing behind hi s ill icit intent ion. or on the material we can praise the agent in a more general way. for in sta nce by saying: " I respect your character." Finally. we are onl y in terested in cases of COI/SciOIlS cooperation: if I leave a broom outside my door for fi ve minutes and you use it to break a window. typically I will not have coopenlled in any morally interesting way. Now we have 11 fairl y clear handle 0 11 what merel y material cooperation be fore the age nt's action is like: it is engaging in activity that I know he lps the agent do hi s nefarious deeds. even though I do not intend to hel p hi m do the nefarious deeds q1la nefarious. Thus. if I O\\,n a cutlery store and know that some tiny percentage of customers wi ll use the knives for immora l vio lent purposes. I am materially cooperating with ev il. But as thi s example shows. material cooperation need not be wrong. However. observe. that there is apresllmprioll against slich cooperation . One needs a sufficie ntl y serious reaso n to e ngage in it. If the only licit use kni ves had was something completely trivial. I wou ld not be justified in such cooperation with ev il. BUI there are many imporrantlllorally licitll ses of kni ves . and so I am justi fi ed.
Material cooperation after the fact is a much Illore hazy affair. Helping a criminal escape may count as such. Again . nOle that such cooperation can be licit. For inslJ:lnce, if a child has stolen a candy bar in a state that puni shes every theft with death. I would be justified in helping the child escape punishment. (Note that the alternati ve of imposing punishmen t myself would not be ava ilable if I wasn't aLllhorized by the chi ld 's pare nts.) The cooperation would be merely material unless thereby I ex pressed my shari ng in the child's ill ici t intention. Nonetheless. there would be a presumpt ion against such cooperation. One would need to have a sufficientl y serious reason for it.
Profiti"g from evil
Almost everything I said so far is well-known material. But it is now that things get interesting. The question before us is whether plVfitillg from the effects of an evil act counts as cooperation with evil aft er the fact. I shall assume that the profitin g does not constitute ./IJrlllfl/ coope ration. The cooperation is not OJ part of a plan of action of one's own that incl udes the same intended ill icit goal as the evi ldoer had.
Cons ider fiv e cases of profiting fro m evil : THE VIOLINIST - You are a world-famous violi nist and need a new kidney to survive. One of your fans , without consulting you. ki lls Jones. whom he knows to be a good genetic match for yOLi and to have signed an organ donor card . The 1 ! murderer is caug ht. The hos pital linds that Jones's kidneys match YOll and o nl y you . No one but you wo uld benefit from Jo nes's k idney and so you accept the kidney.
T HE POUCEMAN-YOLI became a po liceman in order 10 make money for your fam ily. You would nol make eno ug h money for your famil y were there no crime . since as il happen s be ing a po li ce man is the o nl y job you would be ~\bl e to gel. THE TOURIST -Yo u walk on pavemenl in Ro me. o ri gi na ll y built by slaves.·' It would be less comfortable 10 wa lk o n bare e arth . and so you profit from the fact thm anc ient Ro mans fo rced people into slavery. T HE HISTORIAN -Using his torical records, you reconstruct the dy namics o f pri soner-guard interacti on at Auschwitz, and on that basis you cOlTle up with a new soc iolog ica llheory that ex plains many things. and ha s applicatio n 10 making o ur soc iety a better one. TH E T YPHUS R ESEARCHER -You di scover that some of the gravely immoral ty phus experiments do ne at Auschwitz produced dala that is sc ientificall y valuable. Yo u usc thi s data in your own research, building o n it. think that in each of these five cases. the actions described are de fensible. Nonetheless. I beli eve that there are sign ifi cant differe nces between the cases. I be lieve that the cases of TH E VIOLINIST and TH E T YPHUS RESEARCHER trouble us most. The case of THE T OURIST may trouble us: we may ;.lIld I believe s hould feel a discomfort walking o n the paving stones and thin king of the b lood orlhe slaves ki lled while building Rome . But I think that neither T HE POLICEMAN nor THE HISTORIAN needs to troubl e us at all . You may not s hare these intuitions, but they appear quite pl ausible to me. I hope you will find these intu it ions even more plausible when I fini s h. Now, we co uld say lbat tbe di sco mfort fe lt about the cases of TH E VIOLINtST. TH E T YPHUS R ESE;\RCHER and THE T OURIST is simply due to confusio n. The people fee ling the di sco mfort have not bee n able to internali ze tbe fact that clear/y by accepting the organ, using the data and treading on the pavement they are no t in any way contribuling causa ll y to the bad things done o r expressing approval for them. Or perhaps transferen ce is at fault : we transfer the mo ra l di sapproval of the building o f the pavement o nto our walking on that pavement. albe it in attenuated fonn. But the idea that the di scomfort is confused is not plausible. I be lieve. Arguments that imply thal il is confused are mi ss ing an important moral dimensio n Ihat really is the re.
I thi nk it is fairly clear that the Ari slOtciian prude nt age nl ll'o//Id fe c i di scomfort about THE VIOLINIST. Til E T YPH US RESEA RCII ER and TH E TOUR IST. BUI not aboul TI-IF. POLlCE. \I "N and TH E HISTOR IAN. Yet all fi ve cases are cases of profitin g fro m ev il act io ns in the past. Obse rve. too. that the di stance that the evil aClion s are removed from Ihe present is not what makes fo r the difference between the problematic and unproble matic cases . After all. the policeman and tbe violini st both deal with very recent evi1s, whi le o ur historian and typhus researcher bo th profi t from an ev il that is equally far bad . And the paving stones are much o lder tha n the crimes the po li ce man solves Of tbe structure of instituti onali zed evil that the historian studies.
Rath e r. the differe-Ilce. I submit. is thai o ur vio lin ist. touri st and typhu s researche r all pro fit from ev il in more or less th e way that the malefac to r inte nded for the ev il to be pro fi ted fro m. Th e vio l ini st' s fan kill ed Jones in o rd er for tbe viol ini st to ha ve Jo nes' kidn ey. The "owne rs" of th e sla ve s intended 10 build a pavement that peo ple cou ld walk, maybe even hop ing it would be pari of the appea l of an "eternal"' c it y. It is plau sib le lhat the Naz i doclo rs d id re searc h on ty phu s in part to pro mote the sc ie ntific und erstandi ng of th e di sea se (and in pan to furth e r the war effo rt o n the Easte rn Front ). BlIt th e c rim inal rare ly commits c rimes in o rd er to e nco urage us 10 employ po li ceme n, and Rudo lf Hoss certa inl y d id not se rve a s the co mmandant at A usc hw it z in o rder to pro vide hi sto rian s wi th a c ase stud y of a radi ca ll y unju st societ y. I think thi s difference is s ig nifi ca nt. And l ho pe to soon show why.
Frustrating evildoers
There is a partic ular satisfaction people ge t fro m see ing ev il punished and an indignation at seeing the wicked prosper. Traditio nally. the problem of ev il inc luded bolll the sufferings of the. innocelll tim/the apparent good fOflU ne of the wicked. The laller is no lo nger fel t to be as problematic nowa<!u ys-such a concern is felt to be 100 "venge ful"" , Nietzsche offered us the idea that the satisfactio n we got from seeing peopl e suffer was what made sense of retributive puni shment: Fred has hurt Bob and since Fred cannOt undo Bo b's pain he repays Bo b by g iving him the joy of seeing Fred suffer, Nietzsc he is wrong. I think. If he were right. then society would suffi cie ntly do j ustice by lying to Bob that Fred is suffe ring. and surely that is not suffic ient for justice.
I think there is somethill g rig ht about the feeling that it is appro priate tbat the wicked should be puni shed. tilat tbey should suffe r. not j ust pOllr ellcourager les tlU/res. but that justice mig ht be do ne. It is a feeli ng too deeply ti ed to o ur noti ons of justice 10 go away. The main argument ~ againsl this isj usllhallhc idea is 100 vengci'ul for illo be appropriate for us. that there can be no rationa l justifi cati o n for it. I wi ll argue that there is a rat io na l justification that has a surpri sing connection with our altitudes towards profiting from evil. though I a m aware that my story does not ex haust what is to be said about retributi ve punishment-I know that there are cases where the story is in suffic ie nt. J As a ge neral methodological point. when we have a dee p-seated affecti ve ethical intuit io n. o ne no t obviously rooled in a vice bw connected wit h a vinue (in thi s case. that of justice). there is a presumptio n in favor of a project of justifying rather than ex plaining away this intuition.
Observe that it is not just lilly suffering of the wicked. or just any suffering that is causally connected with the crime . that g ives the most sati sfac tion. We wa nt an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. but not a tooth for an eye or an eye for a tooth. Thi s need not be judic ially imposed For us to be satisfied. If the fan goes deaf sho rtl y after killin g Jo nes in orde r to save the vio linist's life and therefore can never hear the vio lini st' s mu sic fo r the sake of whi ch he killed Jones. we consider thi s "poelic justice:' If the plantation goes broke whil e the slaves are employed. we find thi s deepl y appro pri ate. tho ugh we sympathi ze wit h the slaves who will bear the brunt of thi s failure.
If Nietzsche were right. it would be the gre atest possibl e degree of suffe ring in the ev ildoer that wou ld sati sfy our instinct fo r justice. But , rather. it is the greatest poss ibl e appropn{/fl!/Iess o f the malefactor's suffering that sati sli es us. A nd it appears that we take it to be very appropri ate when the malefactor suffers by being deprived of precisely that which he sought to achi eve: The fan who wanted to li sten to more music and commitled murder who goes deaf and the explo iter who loses money. Observe . interestingly, that we find the second case rather sat isfying even though the suffe rings of the slave "owner" through bankruptcy are incomparably small er than those that he had imposed on the slaves. We may fe el that justice demands more sulfcring from the master. but the appropri ateness of the suffe ring imposed is indi sputable. This. I think . is suffic ient to show that our notion o f "poetic justice" is not just vengefulness. Appropriate retributi ve justice does seem to restore the order of the uni verse.
If I am right. then o ne rati ona le for retributi ve justice is that it ji'//sfrllfes the intentions o f the malefactor. She wanted money: she gets bankruptcy. He wanted mu sic: he never hears any anymore. This is true eve n when the fru strated intentions of the malefacto r are good o nes. After all. it is good that a person enjoys music. and the more people enjoy music the beller it is. in so far as thi s goes. Converse ly. we are indignant whe n an evi ldoer achi eves that goal which he di d the illic it acti o n for-the professor who becomes famou s because of a paper plagiari zed fro m an obscure third-world journal. the fan who ki lls to be ab le to hear the violi ni st's music and who spends the rest of his li fe enjoy ing the viul inisl' s co ncerts, the slave "owner" who g rows in wealth.
Thi s suggests thai il is prima jacie a good thing to fru strate an ev ildoe r' s des ig ns. to di srupt his action pla n, and it is primajocie a bad thing to cooperate in the ac tion plan that the illi c it action is an integral in strumental prlrt (If. Now o ne ca n coope rate in th e acti on pla n long after the ill ici t actio n was done, by promoting tha t goal whi c h th e ma le fa ctor wanted promot ed and promoting it in the way in w hi ch he wa nted it promoted, indeed whe n one 's action was imp li c itl y o r exp li c it ly a part of that malefactor's ac tion plan, Thi s is cooperation in evil. and it is opposed to the prill/a Jacie good. a good of justice. of d isrupting the ac ti o n plan . Note that il need not count as cooperation in evil (If all w hen one promotes the same goal that the malefac to r had by a means differelll from those the malefaclOr inte nded. There was no prima facie wrongness in ac ting fo r the ameliorat ion of th e co ndition of the German people in the aftermath of the First World War, even though this was th e same goa l Hi tler had set for him selL as long as o ne proceeded by cau sa ll y independent means.
Likewise. if th ose philosophe rs and th eologians who c laim thai in some way each pe rson a lways seeks beat itude in every action as an ultimate e nd are righ t. it does nOi follow th ai il is wrong to help the ev ildoer ac hi eve I'WI part of hi s illic.i t action phlll. bu t we woul d like to depart from hi s planned mea ns fo r achievi ng thi s, If this is righl. then the same kinds of cons iderati ons that show up when analyzi ng o ur intuit ions about retributive justice are re levant to the question of profiting from ev il , Plain ly, the poli ce man is acting tojrustrate the action plans of the criminal s. and the money he receives e nables him to make a vocation of doi ng so. There is no presumption of any sort against thi s.
If. however. I were a te mporarily unemployed fireman and a colleague scI fire 10 a forest not to be ne fit herse lf but to benefit me. there would be a presumption against my profiting from thi s, Nonethe less. the primajacie badness of cooperating materially in this evil would be easily overridden by my need to cooperate in fighting off the bad effects of my colleague's action, On the other hand, it was part o f the action plan of the bu ilders of Rome that peopl e should e njoy the paveme nt, that they should admire the mi ght of Rome. and so on, The touri st by doing thi s is materi ally comp li cil. Again. thi s is a defeasible consideration. In this case . like in that of the fireman . il is a consideralion defeated in a particularly powerfu l \ way by aspects of the situation closely connected with the evil s done.
Despite not being justly co mpensated for their labor and nor being given a choice about the work, the slaves were workers. They did good work . In enjoy ing the fruit of their labor after many ce nturies, one is showing respect to their solid workmansh ip. Tearing up the pavement would, on the other hand, be di srespectful 10 these workers.
Go back to the case of TH E T YPHUS RESEARCHER. There is, I think. a prill/a facie badness in her use of the Nazi research data, insofar as the research was done to further the state of science. and hence the researcher' s actions were implic it ly a part of the act ion plan of the Nazi doctors. They inte nded to produce scicntitic data (and by and large failed in this, but let us assume that this is a case where they succeeded ) that wou ld be used by future sc ientists.
One is playing their game by using the data. Nonetheless, the cooperat ion is on ly material. One is furthering some of the Nazi doctors' goals. but thi s consideration against one's action is defea si ble by the significan t medical be netits that the data, I am supposing in my tictional case. make possible.
Consider a variant case . Suppose you are a Soviet doctor and you helped liberate Auschwitz. You come upon the data. You reali ze that you can use the data in order to strengthen the war effort against Nazi Germany, both by <l better understanding of the weak nesses of soldiers afnicted with typhus and by ameliorating the condition of Allied soldiers at the front. And so you use the data preci sely for thi s purpose . Here. I think. there should be no di scomfort. On the contrary. there should be a just sati sfaction that one is acting in a way that the malefactors did nOI intend and by doing so fru strating one of their intentions for their ev il actionhelping the German war effort.
An agent's intentions may ex tend beyond hi s natural lifespan . Someone who gathers sc ientifi c dUia may do so for the si.lke of posterity. It is poss ibl e to promote or frustrate the goals of a person even after he is dead. There is prill/a fac ie reason to frustrate these goals by not goi ng along with his action plan. by not being a pawn in hi s game.
Note. too, how the intuitions here go 10 some degree along with the intuiti on that temporal di stance from the agent matters. For. apart from megalomaniacs and the truly great (whether for good or evi l). our plans peter out in the future. People Illay have plan s for their children and grandch ildren and maybe great-grandchildren. Someone might have the intenti on of producing a continuous line of descendants or of attaining etemal life through religious means, but apart from these kinds of cases the horizons of our intentions is Sh0l1. The further we are rellloved from the evil deed, the less likel y that we are doing what the malefactors intended us to do. November. 2004 
The Cell-Line Research Case
In the case of cell -li ne research, the researchers illicitly extracting the cells probably saw themsel ves as ,~ciell1isfs, as people promoting future sc ientific research. In sofar as one is sc ientificall y bui ldi ng on their work, one may well be doing exactly what they intended one to do. One is being a cog in their actio n plan , and hence one is cooperating materially with ev il. There is a pres umption against that: it :is a pr;mafacie bad thing to do. assuming of course, as I do, that the init ial activi ty was illicit.
The Nmional Catholic Bioethi cs Center, when asked 10 comment. compared the research to two cases. The first is that of receiv ing organs from a murder victim. We can now see that thi s analogy is ambiguous between an unprob lematic case where th{! person is killed for a reason independen t of Ihe organ donation. in which case the murderer' s action plan is not at all furthered by the lise of tht: organs, and there is no prima fiu.:ie consideration again , and the problematic case of the violini st.
The second compari son case was t!hat of anti -abortion advocates using pictures of aborted fetuses. For the pictu res to ex ist a prior abortion had to have occurred. However, thi s fa il s as an analogy now that we see what the most serious problem with profiting from the proceeds of an evil is. For clearly the use of the pictures does not further any action plan that the abortionist has. but on the contrary is meant to counter the action plan s coming from the general maxim that the abortionist was acti ng on. Thus, there may even be argued to be a prima./ilcie presumption in favor of such use if it frustrates the illicit goals of the abortionist. (Of course I leave aside the question whether the use of such pictures is prudent and helpful.) Therefore, nOl every positive reason suffices 10 justify research on cell-lin es derived from abortion s. One needs a IJlVp0rl iol/ately SIIul/g reason. In the case of vaccine production, this stron g reason is almost surely present-as!.uming one is doi ng the beSI one can to find alternatives to the use of the illicitly deri ved cell lines. In the case of research, thi s has to be analyzed on a case by case basis. If the research is one of how to cure i a mild fOfm of acne and the research is extreme ly unlikely to yield a cure,
I .
it seems wrong-apart, of course . from the general wrongness of wasti ng research resources. If. however. the research is very likely to yield a cure for a fata l foml of cancer. then it seems acc.eptable. 1 I have no idea what to say about the in-between cases. nor how to draw the line. In general. there are no math~~matica l formu lae for weighing costs and benefits, for weighing different kinds of considerati ons, though such fomlUlae do ex ist in specific cases (for instance. if the cost is the doing of an intrinsically wrong action, the cost is always too high). But nonetheless I think thai when one does something Ihat has a presumption again st 11. that is prima facie bad. one has usua lly reason to feel a certain discomfort . Thi s di scomfort is a recognition of the fact that something objectively bad comes from one 's actio n, even tho ugh o ne is no t intending itto do so.
For instance. while the researcher is. I shall assume, nol intending to pro mote the action plan of the malefactor qua actio" plan of 'he 
Objections
(i) £ al"acl ioll of cells in fet uses nor aborted for research p urposes is
IIot wrOllg. One might arg ue that the require ment of consent for organ do nation is not mo rall y required. thoug h it is politicall y prudent in a n indi vidualistic society. Our soc iety's di staste fo r non-consensual o rgan transplants should not deceive us into thinking that such transplants are actuall y wro ng.
If this o bj ection succeeds. the n my arg ument in Secti on 2 for the w rongness of the extractio n of fetal ce ll s fails . Note that suc h extracti on need not constitute either fo rmal o r material cooperatio n with the abortio n aft er the fact if the extraction was not o ne of the reasons for whic h the abortion was done . Therefore. the rest of my arg ument would seem to be inapplicable. and revisions of acce pted c urrent Catholic medical ethics standards would be call ed for. Nonethe less. my general analysis of cooperation after the fact would . J think. have plausibility, even if it lacked application to the case at hand .
Two respo nses are possible. The fir st is that while such extraction lIeed lIo r constitute cooperatio n. in practice it oftcn does. The researc her has some kind of a fo nnal arrangement with the abo rtio ni st and it is unlikel y that thi s arrangement is such as to communicate to the aborti onist anything o ther than approval of the aborti on.
Secondly. we sho uld not be unduly skeptical of our moral intuitio ns about non-consensual use of other peo ple's organs. A human body after death is still something that call s for a respect akin to that whi ch a li ving body recei ves, albeit ex pressed d iffere ntl y. Eve n a corpse should not be treated as a mere thing. g iven its imimate connectio n with the li vi ng body of the person. Now, it is acceptable for a person to g ive him self to another bod il y and it is acceptable fo r the other to rece ive that gifl. e.g .. on personalist grounds that say that the nature of a human person is to be a g ift. BU I it is arguably not acceptab le for a pe rson to simpl y rake alld lise ano ther person. And a si milar kind o f respect is call ed for fo r the body o f the person even afte r death : it is no t a thin g to be mere ly taken and used .
tho ugh it may be received as a gift.
( ii) This analysis implies Iilal il does 1101 maul!/' whether Ihe cells cllrremly IIsed for resea rch art! onrological/y removed jiYJm Ihe original cells. On this anal ysis, allihat matters. il seems, is the "di stance" measured re lati ve to the orig ina l malefactor's intentio ns . Yet whe n people who were o ri g inall y o pposed to such research find out that a gencti c modification took place along the ce ll -line , their o pposi ti on tcnds to weaken. Thus. my anal ysis. it seems, does not correctly capture the moral issues involved .
At least fo ur responses are possib le. The !irst is simp ly for me to di g in my heels. The o llIo logical modificati on indeed does not affect things. We may feel it does because usually signiticant chan ges in the things produced from evil also d istance the effecls fro m the inlentions o f the orig inal malefuctor. However, in this case, this is o nl y an ill usio n. akin to that whereby a physically smaller ite m may seem to be furth er away. since the orig inal mulefactor's intentions included thi s transfo rmation.
Second ly. o ne mi ght argue that the greater the number of steps lead ing to a g iven poi nt in a male factor's pl an of aClio n. w ith o nly the fi rst step in the p lan be ing intrinsicall y wrong. the lesser the presumption against cooperati on at thm po int. Thi s, however. seems implausible. For o n the account I have g iven, it is (he distunce vis-a-v is the male facto r's inte ntions thm matte rs. And the malefactor may just as much intend things many steps away as things closer 10 himself. Indeed . sure ly, the malefacto r inte nds the e nd . whi ch is many ste ps removed . just as much as he intends the means.
T h ird ly. und perhaps most smi sfy ingly, o ne mi ght no te that there are mu lt ipl e moral dimensio ns along whi ch an acti on can be measured . Thus when I lie to someone that an unsound bridge is sound . , do wrong both by ly in g and by potentially causi ng physical harm. It may be that the notion o f ownership o f one's body and of the genetic descendants of that body is not complelely fl awed . While thi s is not ownershi p simpliciter. there Illay be somethin g sufficie ntly analogous to ow nershi p to produce ce lt ain presumptions against use of the desce ndant materi al wi thout the person 's permissio n.
Thi s may evcn be connected in sume way 10 the ri ghts of parents with respect to chi ldren. If so. then ge netic mod ification weakens the link ~ to the ori ginal person. and he nce weakens the presumptions. Note that thi s wou ld al so stre ngthen the response to (i). by giving another dimension to the badness of the o riginal deri vation. namely the dimensio n of some thing analogous to theft.
However. to work out the detai ls here is a difficult. and perhaps imposs ible. task. Suppose that details cannOI be worked o ut and in the end there is no analogy between one 's re lati onship to one 's ge netic descendant material and o ne's re latio nship to one 's propel1y. Nonethel ess, there clearly is at least the appearal1ce o f an analogy. and th is appearance wou ld be enough to explain o ur intuitio n that geneti c modificat io n decreases wrongness. though without justifying thi s intuitio n. Our mo ral feelings can . afte r all. go wrong.
Applications
Are the re any practical conseque nce of thi s view? There may we ll be. I do nO( have a story abo ul how one wei ghS the benefit s of a given research project o ver and against lhe prima facie badness of cooperating materi all y with a past ev il. The decisio n probabl y needs to be made on a c ase~b y+ca sc basis by an Ari stotelian plllv llimos. At the same time. it is essential that the p l1 1'OIIilll 05 when making the decisio n should be informed by the correct theory of why the coo peration is prima f acie bad and precise ly what is bad abolll such cooperation. The account given will contribute to suc h a moral educatio n of the agent.
Moreover. becau se there is something prima Jacie bad abo ut such cooperatio n. there is thereby positi ve reason to pursue methods, whether of producing of vaccines or o f do ing research. that avoid such cooperation. It might be poss ibl e. for instance. 10 seek sympathetic private donors for such purposes, and this is the SOl1 of thing that research instituti ons have a reason to pursue .
Finally. because the decision needs to be made on a case+by-case basis. an argument cou ld be made that stro ng infonned consent doctrines require that persons receiving any treatment that involves such cooperati on. or proxies of these persons. be informed of the ethical issues invol ved.
Thi s may mean that parents Illay need to be infonned about the ethical issues in the case of vacc inations, wllich c urrentl y they apparent ly are nol. Gi ven the lack of an objective rule for weighing the issue. espec ia ll y in the case of vaccinatio ns fo r di seases that are generall y unlikel y to be life+lhreatening, it might be necessary fo r the indiv idual paren! to make the dec isio n. Of course one mi ght think . o n paternali sti c gro unds. that pub lic he alth considerations override the need for info rmed consent. and so il is suffici e nt for the medical personnel to make the decision.
Weakening in formed consent requ irements in favor of public health leads to a dangerous slippery slope. however. and so probab ly should o nly be do ne w hen absolute ly necessary.s
